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HUSTLE AND FLOW: A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
 
BY DANIEL M. KATZ & DEREK K. STAFFORD‡ 
 
 
 Scholars have long asserted that social structure is an important feature of a 
variety of societal institutions.1  Whether analyzing private or public, non-professional or 
professional organizations, the existing literature consistently asserts how social factors 
and not necessarily expertise dictate not only directives but also an organization’s 
substantive institutional practices.2  Extrapolating to law giving institutions—most 
notably the aggregate outputs of the federal judiciary—we believe social structure, and 
the formal and informal interactions between judicial actors, at least in part, charts the 
course of doctrinal development.  Specifically, if when considering a given legal decision 
jurists either formally or informally consider the views of their colleagues then properly 
conceptualizing the nature and mapping the path of such “peer effects” would appear to 
be a critical task for the public law scholarship.3   
                                                 
‡ Daniel M. Katz, J.D., M.P.P. University of Michigan.  Ph.D. Pre-Candidate, Department of Political 
Science and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan.  Derek K. Stafford, Ph.D. 
Pre-Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan.  The authors would like to thank 
Lada Adamic, Omri Ben-Shahar, Pamela Brandwein, F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Owen Jones, Marvin Krislov, 
Jennifer Miller-Gonzales, Justin McCrary, J.J. Prescott, Rick Riolo, Charles Shipan, David Stras as well as 
participants in the 2007 Society for Evolutionary Analysis in Law Conference (Bloomington, IN) and the 
2008 Southern Political Science Association (New Orleans, LA) for all contributions, comments and 
assistance.  Special Thanks to the John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics at University of Michigan 
Law School for its gracious financial support of this project.   
1 See e.g. Brian Colwell, Deference or Respect? Status Management Practices Among Prison Inmates, 70 
Soc. Psych. Q. __ (Dec. 2007 Forthcoming) (analyzing the social structure of a California prison and 
determining that social standing among the prisoners derives from interpersonal dynamics); MICHAEL 
LOUNSBURY & MARC VENTRESCA, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS REVISITED (2002); Kenneth 
A. Frank, Jeffrey Y. Yasumoto, Linking Action to Social Structure Within a System: Social Capital Within 
and Between Subgroups, 104 Amer. J. Soc. 642 (1998); David Knoke, Networks as Political Glue: 
Explaining Public Policy Making in SOCIOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC AGENDA (WILLIAM J. WILSON ED., 1993);  
DAVID KNOKE, POLITICAL NETWORKS: THE STRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE (1990); Barry Markovsky, David 
Willer & Travis Patton, Power Relations in Exchange Networks, 53 Amer. Soc. Rev. 220 (1988); REID 
HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983) (providing insight into the 
role of social influence in jury decision making);  Edward O. Laumann, Peter V. Marsden & Joseph 
Galaskiewicz, Community-Elite Influence Structures: Extension of a Network Approach, 83 Amer. J. Soc. 
594 (1977); ARTHUR STINCHCOMBE, SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATIONS (1965); EMILE DURKHEIM, 
DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (1893).  
2 Of great interest to the study of legal institutions are the early network based studies of the medical 
profession and their subsequent extensions.  See generally J.S. COLEMAN, E. KATZ & H. MENZEL, MEDICAL 
INNOVATION: A DIFFUSION STUDY (1966) (finding the implementation of new medical technology more 
closely tracks a network based upon the social connections between doctors than a network based upon 
expertise).  See also J.S. Coleman, E. Katz & H. Menzel, The Diffusion of an Innovation among 
Physicians, 20 Sociometry (1957). 
3 A small but growing segment of the public law literature is devoted to such contextual understandings of 
judicial decision making.  See Charles M. Cameron & Craig P. Cummings, Diversity and Judicial 
Decision-Making: Evidence from Affirmative Action in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 1971-1999, Paper 
Presented at the 2003 Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (manuscript on file with 
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 Succinctly stated, if legal outcomes are at least in part socially constituted, then a 
descriptive effort designed to characterize the relevant social architecture should 
complement the existing public law literature perhaps helping to bridge the divide 
between the behavioral, strategic institutionalist and historical institutionalist decision 
making theories.4  Of course, acknowledging a role for “judicial peer effects” does not 
itself produce a social scientific approach designed to isolate the social linkages between 
jurists.  Prior studies relying upon academic ratings5 or citation counts find institutional 
authority alone does not explain the prestige and influence across judges.6  Instead, this 
literature documents great variance in judicial esteem even across judges with equal 
formal authority.   
 Building on the themes of this largely non-supreme court centric scholarship, this 
study uses social network analysis to visualize the social structure of the overall federal 
judiciary.  Although network analysts often rely upon survey data to build the 
connections between actors,7 in the context of the federal judiciary, there is significant 
reason to believe that survey based network data would suffer from rampant non-
response or other systematic biases.  Thus, in order to develop a picture of the social 
landscape it is necessary to rely upon a proxy measure for social connectivity.  We 
believe the revealed preferences displayed in the aggregate flow of law clerks between 
judges reflect a proxy for social and professional esteem.8  While not conclusive, the use 
of this proxy in a network analysis provides a partial snapshot of the social structure of 
the federal judiciary.   
 This study visualizes the traffic of law clerks over the decade long period of the 
“natural” Rehnquist Court (1995-2004).9  As operationalized herein, judges who share 
                                                                                                                                                 
author) (applying a “social economics approach” to the behavior of judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals).  
Cameron & Cummings cite a number of studies which “cast considerable doubt on what might be called 
the traditional political science approach to decision-making on collegial courts.  See e.g. Sean Farhang & 
Gregory Wawro, Institutional Dynamics on the U.S. Court of Appeals: Minority Representation Under 
Panel Decision Making, 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 299 (2004); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, 
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1717 (1997); Gerald Gryski, Eleanor Main & William 
Dixon, Models of State High Court Decisionmaking in Sex Discrimination Cases, 48 J. of Pol. 143 (1986).  
See also Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on 
Judging, Paper Presented at the 2007 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (manuscript on 
file with the author). 
4 For an very brief introduction to some of these approaches see generally Section II (A) infra. 
5 See e.g. Gregory A. Calderia, In the Mirror of the Justices: Sources of Greatness on the Supreme Court, 
10 Pol. Behav. 247 (1988) (describing the literature using subjective evalutations.)  See also Rodney Mott, 
Judicial Influence, 30 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 295 (1936).  
6 See e.g. David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 28 J. Legal Stud. 371 (1999); William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. 
Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. Legal Stud. 
271 (1998); William G. Ross, The Ratings Game: Factors That Influence Judicial Reputation, 79 Marq. L. 
Rev. 401 (1996); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody 
Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 41 (1993).  
7 See STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 45-48 (1994) (noting that 
the questionnaire is the data collection method “most commonly used (especially when actors are 
people)”). 
8 For the argument supporting the use of this proxy see Section IIB infra.   
9 The “natural Rehnquist court” is typically defined as the period from 1994-2005 where the composition of 
judges remained unchanged.  To synergize this period with clerk hiring calendar, our data is restricted to 
the 1995-2004 time period.  For use of the term in another empirical context see e.g. Lori A. Ringhand, 
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clerks may be both socially connected and held in high regard within the relevant 
community.   In other words, the structural prestige derived from the network analysis of 
law clerk traffic is not separable into its social and professional components.  
Undoubtedly, it is such individuals who maximize in both relevant dimensions who are 
most likely to be able to persuade the aggregate institution to support their specific vision 
of the law.   
 The precursor to evaluating the doctrinal consequences that social structure 
imposes is an effort to characterize its nature.  As there is no “pause button” in the 
external environment, reputation effects, esteem, prestige and influence are in a 
consistent state of flux.10  What is needed is a methodology that can capture the richness 
of this dynamic landscape.  Complexity generally, and network analysis more 
specifically, may help harness this dynamism thereby allowing for unique insight into the 
role of peer effects in the federal judiciary.     
 To motivate the use of network analytics, the article begins in Section I with a 
description of the science of networks as a subset of the larger field of complexity.11  
With homage to Moreno, Milgram, Grannovetter, Watts and Strogatz as well as others, it 
describes how network analysis,12 the long standing but recently popularized social 
science methodology allows for the insightful study of a variety of social systems.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 
Const. Comm. __ (2007 Forthcoming).    
10 Actors consistently enter and exit the network and thus within the newly constituted social world their 
doctrinal legacy may or may not sustain.  Although our current effort is not suited to capture the notion of 
legacy, even a casual observer would recognize that although many jurist’s views are forgotten the views of 
a selected few persist.  Federal judges such as Learned Hand, Jerome Frank, Henry Friendly and J. Skelly 
Wright as well as State Supreme Court justices such as Cornelius Moynihan, Hans Linde, Roger Traynor 
and Stanley Mosk impose distinctive legacies.    
11 While certainly not part of the mainstream legal literature, complexity has made important contributions 
to the legal scholarship.  See e.g. Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, On the Regulation of Networks 
as Complex Systems: A Graph Theory Approach, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1687 (2005); David G. Post & 
Michael B. Eisen, How Long is the Coastline of the Law? Thoughts on the Fractal Nature of Legal 
Systems, 29 J. Leg. Stud. 545 (2000) (using fractal structure theory of citation to precedent in judicial 
opinions); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity and Legislative Signatures: Lending Discrimination Laws as a 
Test Case, 12 J.L. & Pol’y 637 (1996) (employing chaos theory to review legislative responses to alleged 
lending discrimination);  Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 641 
(1996) (discussing legal evolution and invoking both path dependence and systems theory);  J. B. Ruhl, The 
Fitness of Law: Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical 
Meaning for Democracy, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 1407 (1996) (discussing both complexity and the general 
evolutionary model); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear 
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546 (1994) (discussing chaos 
theory in the context of capital market regulation).  For an extensive list of scholarship complied by 
Professor  J.B. Ruhl see http://law.vanderbilt.edu/seal/resources/readingscomplex.htm  
12 Formal network analysis or invocation of its core concepts has recently been witnessed within legal and 
public law literature.  See e.g. Anthony Paik, Ann Southworth & John P. Heinz, Lawyers of the Right: 
Networks and Organization, 32 L. & Soc. Inq. 883 (2007); James Fowler, et. al., Network Analysis and the 
Law: Measuring the Legal Importance of Precedents at the U.S. Supreme Court, 15 Political Analysis, 324 
(2007); Frank Cross, Thomas A. Smith &  Antonio Tomarchio, Determinants of Cohesion in the Supreme 
Court's Network of Precedents,  San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 07-67, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=924110 ;  Frank Cross & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Empirically Testing Dworkin's 
Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U.  L. Rev. 1156 (2005); David Walsh, On 
the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 
L. & Soc. Rev. 337 (1997).  
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In an effort to justify the use of law clerk traffic as a proxy for social connectivity, 
Section II of this article reviews two major strains of the extant legal literature.  After 
briefly introducing the larger public law literature, it demonstrates how insights drawn 
from the scholarship on the law clerk market might, in part, help consider the social 
structure of the federal judiciary.  Concepts such as social influence are fairly difficult to 
operationalize and, in response, scholars have developed an array of diverse approaches 
to consider such questions.13  We believe that a promising addition to the literature would 
be a graph theoretic approach.  Specifically, notwithstanding any allocative inefficiencies 
present in the judicial law clerk market, it is highly probable that, in the aggregate, 
judicial reputation significantly impacts the matching of law clerks with their employers.  
Thus, as applied to the marriage of these two literatures, the network analysis advanced 
herein relies upon the displayed preferences of both judges and clerks, embedded within 
law clerk traffic, to provide a partial picture of the overall social structure. 
  Section III represents this article’s core contribution.  It begins with a description 
of the significant data collection effort undertaken to support our findings.  Our research 
team collected available information for every federal judicial law clerk employed by an 
Article III judge14 during the full term of the “natural” Rehnquist Court (1995-2004).  
Holding the United States Supreme Court constant and drawing from a base of nearly 
20,000 clerk events,15 Section III provides a series of network based visualizations of 
federal law clerk traffic and then concludes with a characterization of the degree 
distribution the judicial social network. 
 Section IV provides some concluding thoughts about emergence, convergence, 
peer effects and legal change in the federal judicial hierarchy.  We believe social 
structure “matters” for the federal judiciary much like it does for other societal 
institutions.  Namely, if a given judge appreciating his or her position within the 
hierarchical organizations, understands that his or her colleagues might be persuaded to 
follow a vision of the law offered by a jurist with greater social importance, than the 
social architecture driving such convergence is supreme consequential.  Thus, our 
emphasis on social structure is a first-order attempt to contextualize the role of such peer 
effects for the overall federal judiciary.  Although our effort is largely descriptive, the 
social structure of network visualized herein provides insight into how the actions of a 
series of micro-motivated judicial actors map to the judiciary’s overall macrobehavioral 
jurisprudential outputs.16         
 
I. THE SCIENCE OF NETWORKS: FROM MORENO TO MILGRAM TO WATTS AND STROGATZ 
AND BEYOND 
  
 Built upon a combination of linear algebra, graph theory and traditional statistical 
approaches, network analysis should help illuminate the social structure of the federal 
judiciary.  Using nodes to represent actors and ties to represent relations between actors, 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of these approaches see Section IIA infra. 
14 As available clerk information for Senior Status Judges is less far extensive, we choose to omit Senior 
Status Judges from this study. 
15 Hereinafter, a ‘clerk event’ is defined as a given clerk employed for a given year.  For example, a clerk 
hired for a two year interval constitutes two clerk events.  A permanent clerk employed for k years would 
have k law clerk events.      
16 See generally THOMAS SHELLING, MIRCOMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR (1973).  
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network analysis differs from traditional statistical models as it attempts to determine not 
only properties of an individual’s relationships to his or her peers but also the larger 
social structure in which that individual operates.17  A brief review of the history and 
approaches in complexity generally and more specifically network analysis should 
motivate our later move to build a picture of the social landscape using the information 
embedded in the clerk market.  
 
A.  EMERGENCE IN A BROAD CLASS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS MODELS 
Network analysis is a disciplined scientific approach used to understanding the 
interactions between agents in a complex system.18   Although the definition of a 
“complex system” is awkward and can seem nebulous, nearly all definitions would 
specify that the system must exhibit emergent behavior.19   Traditionally, systems display 
emergence when the micro study of individual actors in a given system yields incomplete 
information about the entirety of the organization.20   Instead, interactions between the 
components, at least in part, structure the outputs of the system.21  As Peter Corning 
describes “[A]mong other things, complexity theory gave mathematical legitimacy to the 
idea that processes involving the interactions among many parts may be at once 
deterministic yet for various reasons unpredictable.”22  Common examples of emergence 
include the study of ecosystems where order emerges from the interspecies interactions.  
Emergent systems do not necessarily have logical or deterministic properties.  Thus, their 
outputs cannot always be deduced or predicted.  Consider H2O phase transformations.  
Water boils and freezes at very specific temperatures under controlled conditions, but 
                                                 
17 See STANLEY WASSERMAN & KATHERINE FAUST, SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 17-21 (1994). 
18 Drawn from core concepts developed within the academy, a host of recent literature has popularized the 
study of network analysis.  The devotion of the Ninetieth Aniversary of Forbes Magazine to network 
analysis is one of many indications that this is a renassiance period for the science of networks. See 
generally Networks, Forbes (May 7, 2007) (devoting its Ninetieth Anniversary Issue to the “New” Age of 
Networks).   For a non-exhaustive list of recent popular books in the subject  See also DUNCAN J. WATTS, 
SIX DEGREES: THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2003);  MARK BUCHANAN, NEXUS: SMALL WORLDS 
AND THE GROUNDBREAKING SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED: THE 
NEW SCIENCE OF NETWORKS (2002); MALCOLM GLADWELL THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS CAN 
MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2000). 
19 For more detailed discussion of emergence including applications to a variety of disciplines see generally 
David Chalmers, Strong and Weak Emergence in THE RE-EMERGENCE OF EMERGENCE (PHILIP CLAYTON & 
PAUL DAVIES, EDS. 2006); Tom De Wolf & Tom Holvoet, Emergence Versus Self-Organisation: Different 
Concepts but Promising When Combined, in Engineering Self Organising Systems: Methodologies and 
Applications (Brueckner, S. and Di Marzo Serugendo, G. and Karageorgos, A. and Nagpal, R., eds. 2005); 
STEPHEN WOLFRAM , A NEW KIND OF SCIENCE (2002); JOHN H. HOLLAND, EMERGENCE FROM CHAOS TO 
ORDER (1998). 
20 See generally Holland supra note 19.  De Wolf & Holvoet provide a more detailed working definition of 
emergence.  They argue “[A] system exhibits emergence when there are coherent emergents at the macro- 
level that dynamically arise from the interactions between the parts at the micro-level. Such emergents are 
novel w.r.t. the individual parts of the system.”  See De Wolf & Holvoet supra note 19 at 3. 
21 For an illuminating discussion of emergence and its historical origin see Peter A. Corning, The Re-
Emergence of “Emergence”: A Venerable Concept in Search of a Theory, 7 Complexity 18 (2002).  See 
also BRIAN GOODWIN, HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS: THE EVOLUTION OF COMPLEXITY (2001); 
STEVEN BERLIN JOHNSON, EMERGENCE: THE CONNECTED LIVES OF ANTS, BRAINS, CITIES, AND SOFTWARE 
(2001).  The last decade witnessed the creation of an academic journal devoted to exploring the concepts of 
emergence.  See generally Emergence available at http://emergence.org/index.html  
22 See Corning supra note 20 at 23.  
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nothing about the change in temperatures affects the actual water molecules.  At 100°C 
and 0°C precisely the molecules begin to interact differently with one another; and thus, 
from liquid, new macro-worlds of solid ice and water vapor emerge.23  An extensive 
study of the chemical characteristics between these moments of transition would not 
predict the dramatic transformations that occur at these threshold points.24  In short, the 
whole is different from the sum of its parts. 
Automobile traffic is another example of a complex system.  To characterize the 
global properties of a traffic system, one could code a set of individual level variables, 
including the horsepower of the respective vehicles, the disposition of the drivers as well 
as a host of decisional rules employed by the driver, such as including the leave space, a 
driver’s ideal speed and lane.  Even with an understanding of all of these properties, it is 
ultimately the interactions between actors that structure outputs for the overall system.  
Namely, whether flow or bottleneck will emerge is a function of the intermingling of 
individuals, each of whom possess a host of these attributes and decisional rules.  It 
depends upon exactly which agents are proximate to other individuals. 
Returning to the matter of inquiry, the federal judiciary exhibits behavior that 
might be considered emergent.  While a judge in a given case may rule in isolation of 
other judges, in general jurists do not exist in a state of complete social and professional 
isolation from their peers.  The socialization and training of the legal community occurs 
through various repeated interactions with one’s current or future peers at moments and 
places throughout the hierarchy.25  In some cases, social interactions begin in law 
school26 and in others they begin even sooner.  Accordingly, if judicial perceptions and 
outcomes are at least in part, the by-product of these interactions, then larger 
interpretative frames, themselves the aggregation of various individual decisions, are 
assuredly emergent.  As such, the federal judiciary is a “complex system” and would 
benefit from methodologies reserved for the study of complexity.   
 
B.  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 One method to study a complex system is network analysis, an approach which 
maps the social structure by quantifying the interactions between agents.27  In the early 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 In the context of water under standard pressure, these thresholds occur at 32°F and 212°F. 
25 See e.g. DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE REPLICATION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC 
AGAINST THE SYSTEM (2004).   
26 See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL (2007).  Id. citing Christa McGill, Producing 
Lawyers: The Effects of Institutional Hierarchy on the Social Structure of Law Schools, PhD Diss., Duke 
Univ. (2002).  
27 The origins of network science are closely linked to the development of graph theory.  Leonhard Euler, 
who major contributions include the first theorem in graph theory, developed his work in an effort to solve 
the Konisberg Bridge Problem. In reduced form, the Konigsberg bridge problem asks whether it is possible 
to traverse the town of Konigsberg, while both crossing each of its seven bridges only once and closing the 
circuit by returning to one’s point of origin.  Euler demonstrated this was not possible.  With reference to 
the Konisberg Bridge problem, mathematicians ask whether “there exists any Eulerian path on the 
network.”  See MARK NEWMAN, ALBERT-LAZZLO BARABASI & DUNCAN J. WATTS, THE STRUCTURE AND 
DYNAMICS OF NETWORKS 2 (2006).  For more on the life and work of Leonhard Euler see C. EDWARD 
SANDIFER, THE EARLY MATHEMATICS OF LEONHARD EULER (2007).  For more information on graph theory 
See e.g. FRANK HARARY, GRAPH THEORY (1999); GARY CHARTRAND, INTRODUCTORY GRAPH THEORY 
(1985).  
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twentieth century, researches such as Jacob Moreno used network analysis to compile 
sociograms which diagramed social relationships and identified individuals who held 
structural positions that were indicative of leadership.28  Following this early work, 
Stanley Milgram did much to advance the popularity of network analysis.  Through his 
study of communal relationships in society in the 1960’s, the “small worlds” or “six 
degrees of separation” conception entered the popular lexicon.29  In his experiment, 
Milgram sent letters to a sample of people in Kansas and Nebraska and asked the subjects 
if they would attempt to send these letters to a stockbroker in Boston, Massachusetts.30  
On average, the letters which reached the target only passed through the hands of 6.5 
people, and thus Milgram argued the social world was quite small, with only six degrees 
separation between a random selection of people.31   
The logic supporting the original Milgram experiment was fairly straightforward.  
If every individual each knows 150 people and each of those 150 people know 150 
others, the exponential function exceeds the total population of world before the sixth 
order of magnitude.  Such a hypothesized network is a random network where the 
interrelations between an individual’s second degree friends are not modeled.  Mark 
Granovetter realized that world’s social connections do not emerge randomly.32  People 
cluster, organize in cliques; thus, if two people are strong friends the likelihood that they 
have shared friends is fairly high.33  This commonality between connections of people in 
similar groupings would not allow the macro-network to exhibit the exponential growth 
suggested by Milgram’s theory.  Since Milgram’s experiment and subsequent 
                                                 
28 It is hard to understate the contribution of Jacob Moreno to the development of social network analysis.  
Along with Kurt Lewin and Fritz Heider, the first half of the twentieth century witnessed dramatic 
developments in the science of networks.  For example, Moreno developed the “sociogram” an apparatus 
that allows social relationship to be drawn using analytic geometry.  See JACOB MORENO, WHO SHALL 
SURVIVE? (1934).  Kurt Lewin extended Moreno’s work arguing the structural properties of social space 
could uncovered using a host of mathematical techniques including graph theory, topology and set theory. 
See e.g. KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE (1951).      
29 See Stanley Milgram, The Small World Problem, 22 Psych. Today 61 (1967).   Milgram is often credited 
with coining “six degrees of separation.”  However, many attribute the term to Hungarian author, Frigyes 
Karinthy whose volume of short stories invoked such concepts.  See FRIGYES KARINTHY, EVERYTHING IS 
DIFFERENT (1929). 
30 Milgram, however, did not provide the subjects with address of the stockbroker; he instead insisted 
individuals send the letter to someone they thought would be socially closer to the man in Boston. 
31 See Jeffery Travers & Stanley Milgram, An Experimental Study of the Small World Problem, 32 
Sociometry 425 (1969) (where authors vary the starting populations and “provide a first technical report on 
the small world method.”); C. Korte & Stanley Milgram, Acquaintance Networks Between Racial Groups, 
15 J. of Personal & Soc. Psych. 101 (1970) (replicating the small world experiment between different racial 
groups).   
32 Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 Amer. J. of Soc. 1360 (1973). 
33 Id. Granovetter argued that this empirical fact did not completely undercut widespread interconnectivity 
only that widespread societal links are an artifact of one’s weak connections.  In his seminal article “The 
Strength of Weak Ties,” Grannovetter provided an addendum to Milgram’s theory.  Id.  See also Mark S. 
Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 Socio. Theory, 201 (1983).   
Granovetter understood that if Person A was close friends with Persons B and C, then Persons B and C 
were also likely friends with one another.   Accordingly, the stronger the bonds between individuals, the 
more likely their first degree nodes are also connected.  In network analysis, this is known as balance 
theory.  See Fritz Heider, Attitudes and Cognitive Organization, 21 J. of Psych. 107 (1946) (asserting in 
part the idea of balance).  See also Wasserman & Faust supra note 13 at 220-32.      
 - 8 -    
7
Katz and Stafford:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008
   
replications34 still demonstrated a “small world,” Granovetter worked to develop an 
alternative causal account which would sustain the empirical phenomena.  He noticed 
that the weaker the ties between individuals the more likely those connections would not 
coincide.  Hence, these weak ties maintained the small-world characteristics observed by 
Milgram.  Accordingly, Granovetter supplemented Milgram’s by categorizing the 
connections between individuals by the strength of those bonds, while also placing more 
realistic restraints on Milgram’s random networks.   
 Following on these themes of prior scholars, the launch of the current study of 
network analysis can be traced to the Watts and Strogatz small-world model.35  
Motivated by the organizational behavior of fireflies in Southeast Asia these scholars 
demonstrated how a relatively small amount of random wiring can allow a network to 
simultaneously hold both small world properties and high clustering.36  Apparently, 
fireflies in this region have the rather unusual habit of flashing in unison.37  However, 
every neurological analysis of the fireflies indicated that they should not have the mental 
faculty necessary to coordinate this effort.  Although the fireflies may take cues from 
their neighbors, this alone was not enough to generate the witnessed behavior.  Namely, 
in the early evening witnesses commonly observe one firefly light and then another.  
Suddenly, groups of fireflies flash.  Finally, concentrations of hundreds of fireflies on the 
same tree synchronize their flashes in unison.   
                                                
 In the initial moments at dusk when the fireflies are randomly flashing, these 
uncoordinated flashes could be considered possible offerings of timing.  Think of 
applause in an auditorium.  Since only one sequence ultimately emerges, it is important to 
understand how the landscape moves from divergence to convergence, from randomness 
to some sense of relative order.   Undoubtedly, the “location” of an offeror is important.  
Network analyists use terms such as closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality to 
formalize such ideas of structural position.38   
 Watts and Strogatz thought network analysis could provide some insight into the 
behavior of the fireflies.  They used computer programs to simulate the fireflies’ flashing 
based upon different rules about how the insects could react to cues from their neighbors.  
However, none of the simulations reproduced the flashing in unison.  Even with near 
immediate reaction time to the fireflies in close proximity, the overall pattern was still too 
protracted.  Thus, Watts and Strogatz added one more component to their model: they 
gave a small proportion of fireflies the ability to see and thus be able to react to a random 
firefly.  This simulation worked in an egalitarian network because each of the dyads39 is 
relatively equal in its number of connections but with a select few connections across 
great distances.  This approach reflected a successful replication of the observed 
 
34 See Travers & Milgram, supra note 29; Korte & Milgram supra note 29.  
35 Duncan J. Watts & Stephen Strogatz, Collective Dynamics of ‘Small World' Networks, 393 Nature 440 
(1998).  
36 Id.     
37 See e.g. STEVEN H. STROGATZ, SYNC: THE EMERGING SCIENCE OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER 11-40 (2003).  
38 See Wasserman & Faust supra note 13 at 169-220 (1994).   For an extensive discussion of the various 
measures of centrality see Appendix III.  
39 While Mathematicians might provide a more formal definition of dyad involving vectors, tensors and 
vector space, it can loosely be considered as two individuals or units considered as a pair.   
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phenomena and, as constructed, is the biological equivalent to Granovetter’s Strength of 
Weak Ties.40  
 Extrapolating from the fireflies and returning to the social world, there are many 
phenomena that display similar properties.  In reduced form, a cascade is essentially 
emergent behavior upon which there is enough initial convergence by certain actors to 
see it take hold.  Cascades are often driven by a small number of structurally important or 
prestigious actors.  Network analysis is designed to identify such critical actors.   
 In network analysis, the unit of analysis is the network.  The components of the 
network are the nodes, also known as actors or agents, and the arcs or edges, which 
signify the connections between the agents.  In the federal judicial social network, the 
nodes are the individual judges and as operationalized infra, the edges reflect a measure 
of shared clerks between the jurists.  In an undirected network such as the judicial social 
network, the connections or arcs have a magnitude but not necessarily a direction.41   
 
II. DEVELOPING A PROXY FOR THE SOCIAL LANDSCAPE: THE PUBLIC LAW AND CLERKS 
MARKET LITERATURES 
  
 Among the immense public law literature analyzing the operation of the 
American Federal Judiciary are two important strands that together with the greater body 
of available work, advance our understanding of the operation of this important political 
institution.  The first line of scholarship considers the relative prestige and influence of 
various judges and justices.42  Specifically, as a variety of commentators note, the views 
of some courts and some jurists’ seem to be uniquely privileged while others are not 
nearly as well regarded.43  In order to understand the impact this empirical fact imposes 
upon the legal landscape, the literature has been consumed with innovative methods to 
help adjudicate these questions of relative esteem.44  However, regardless of the approach 
employed, virtually all scholarship finds significant variance across judges on the 
question of prestige.   
 Also under the large umbrella of the judicial politics literature, is a largely 
different group of individuals who devote attention to the study of federal law clerks.45  
This “clerks” scholarship includes analysis of the process governing their selection as 
well as their impact upon judicial outputs.  At first glance, this strain of scholarship might 
appear wholly unrelated to the question of relative prestige and influence.  However, a 
careful review counsels otherwise.  There is important information regarding judicial 
                                                 
40 See Granovetter supra note 28. 
41 Our judicial social network based upon clerk traffic, displayed infra, is thorny as the traffic is clearly 
directed but we believe the social importance associated with the linkage travel in both directions.   
42 See e.g. Montogomery A. Kosma, Measuring the Influence of Supreme Court Justices, 27 J. Legal Stud. 
333 (1998); Klein & Morrisore supra note 5; Landes, Lessig & Solimine supra note 5; RICHARD POSNER, 
CARDOZO: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL REPUTATION 74-91 (1990).  
43 See supra note 42.  For a study using an entire court as the unit of analysis see Michael E. Solimine, 
Judicial Stratification and the Reputations of the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 Fla. St. L. Rev. 1331 
(2005).   
44 Id, at 1350.  Professor Solimine provides a very detailed description of the various approaches used 
consider the question.  Discussing the existing studies he notes “Reputation is a difficult subject to 
objectively study.  Couple that with the snapshot quality of most of the studies; they usually cover a 
relatively short period of time or only samples of the judges who constitute a circuit.” Id. 
45 See Section II (B) infra. 
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reputation embedded within the market for judicial law clerks.  Namely, despite any 
existing allocative inefficiencies in the clerk market, clerks more or less seek to work for 
the most prestigious judges and judges seek the “best” clerks.  While not conclusive, we 
believe the consistent movement of law clerks provides significant insight into the role of 
peer effect in judicial decision making.  Later, we will explicitly develop this link—but 
first, we provide introduction to both literatures.   
 
A. FROM QUALITATIVE SUPREME COURT STUDIES TO DECISION MAKING THROUGHOUT 
THE HIERARCHAL FEDERAL JUDICIARY   
 Throughout its long history, the judicial politics sub-field has embraced a variety 
of substantive questions and methodological approaches.  Early work in the subfield 
emphasized the decision making of the United States Supreme Court and privileged the 
use of qualitative methods.  However, these approaches were largely jettisoned as the rise 
of behavioralism ushered in the use of quantitative statistical models across a variety of 
intellectual domains.  Following their prior embrace by allied disciplines such as 
economics, within political science, large N empirical approaches were initially adopted 
in neighboring sub-fields such as legislative politics46 and political participation.47  
 Public law behavioralism is epitomized by The Attitudinal Model where 
Professors Segal and Spaeth derive judicial preferences through attention to the objective 
voting behavior of members of the United States Supreme Court.48 Analyzing aggregate 
voting data, attitudinalists argue as Justices vote, they seek to maximize their individual 
partisan policy preferences.  Thus, in broad stroke their model asserts “Rehnquist votes 
the way he does because he is conservative while Marshall votes the way he does because 
he is extremely liberal.”49  While a significant amount of the current scholarship still 
embraces behavioral studies of the high court, recent years witnessed the increasing use 
of alternative methods as well as the study of other judicial actors.  For example, the past 
                                                 
46 In legislative politics, for example, many studies embracing the behavioralist paradigm use outputs, in 
this case roll call votes of members of congress to characterize and predict legislative behavior.  Suffice to 
say, the literature is vast.   See e.g. Christopher Achen, Measuring Representation, 66 Amer. J. of Pol. Sci. 
(1978); John Jackson & John Kingdon, Ideology, ADA Scores, and Legislative Votes, 80 Amer. J. of Pol. 
Sci. 805 (1992); Keith Krehbiel, Where’s the Party?, 23 Brit. J. of Pol. Sci. 235 (1993); RICHARD L. HALL, 
PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS (1996); Keith T. Poole & R. S. Daniels, Ideology, Party, and Voting in the 
U.S. Congress, 1959-1980, 79 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 373 (1985). 
47 See e.g. ANGUS CAMPBELL, ET.AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER (1960); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE, 
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1972); RAY E. WOLFINGER 
& STEVEN J. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES? (1980); Paul Abramson & John Aldrich, The Decline of Electoral 
Participation in America, 76 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 502 (1982).  
48 See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
(1993).  For a discussion of early behavioral work in the judicial politics subfield see generally NANCY 
MAVEETY, THE PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2003).  Behavioralism generally and attitudinalism more 
specifically has been critized by other scholars.  For a sample of critiques of the attitudinal model, see e.g., 
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1997); Howard Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, 
Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME 
COURT DECISION MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton 
eds.) (2001); FORREST MALTZMAN, ET.AL., CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL 
GAME (2000); Richard A. Brisben, Slaying the Dragon: Segal, Spaeth and the Function of the Law in 
Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 Amer. J. Pol. Sci. 1004, 1007 (1996). 
49 See Segal & Spaeth, supra note 13 at 65. 
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two decades saw the rise of a variety neo-institutional decision making theories50 as well 
as the extensive study of the decision making of courts such as the State Supreme 
Courts51 and the lower federal courts.52     
 This new work is important as both the industrial organization of the judicial 
branch and its norms and variant institutional rules undoubtedly exert influence upon its 
final outcomes.  With the wide variety of actors and institutions, the precise trajectory of 
American law is difficult, if not impossible, to predict as a host of interactive parameters, 
including legal doctrine and partisanship, work to shape the path of American 
jurisprudence.  Yet, the increasing nuance and diversity53 of the judicial politics literature 
certainly brings scholars closer to understanding the complicated landscape in which 
judicial decision making is undertaken.    
 In addition to all of the aforementioned decisional factors, judicial “peer effects” 
are one additional element that received recent study.54   Of course, it is hardly new or 
novel to assert that, in general terms, maintaining high status among one’s peers as well 
as sustaining relationships with one’s close colleagues might, together with other factors, 
                                                 
50 See e.g. Rogers Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the 'New Institutionalism,' and the Future of Public Law, 
82 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 89 (1988) (previewing some of the future development in the public law field); LEE 
EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); FORREST MALTZMAN, ET. AL., CRAFTING 
LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000);  CORNELL CLAYTON & HOWARD GILLMAN 
(EDS) SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (1998). It is important to 
note how institutional theories take a variety of flavors including strategic institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism.  Furthermore, the methods employed by these respective camps range from formal theory 
to qualitative historical methods.  For an attempt to use qualitative historical methods to support a strategic 
account see Daniel Katz, Institutional Rules, Strategic Behavior and the Legacy of Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist: Setting the Record Straight on Dickerson v. United States, 22 J. of L. & Pol. 303 (2006).  
51 See e.g. F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning about Judicial Independence: Institutional Change in the State 
Courts, 33 J. of Legal Stud. 431(2004); Paul Brace, Melinda Gann Hall & Laura Langer, Placing State 
Supreme Courts in State Politics, 1 State Politics & Policy Q. 81 (2001); Donald Songer & Kelly Crews-
Meyer, Does Judge Gender Matter? Decision Making in State Supreme Courts, 81 Soc. Sci. Q. 750 (2000); 
Paul Brace, Laura Langer & Melinda Gann Hall, Measuring the Preferences of State Supreme Court 
Judges, 62 J. of Pol. 387 (2000);  Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State 
Supreme Courts, 54 J. of Pol. 427 (1992); Gregory A. Calderia, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A 
Study of State Supreme Courts, 79 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 178 (1985); Lawrence Friedman, et. al., State 
Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 Stan. L  Rev. 773 (1981). 
52 While there certainly exists important early work on lower courts, recent witnessed substantial amount of 
scholarship studying lower courts.  See e.g.VIRGINIA HETTINGER, STEFANIE LINDQUIST & WENDY 
MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON APPELLATE COURT DECISION MAKING 
(2006); Frank Cross, Appellate Court Adherence to Precedent, 2 J. of Emper. Leg. Stud. 369 (2005);  
DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS (2002); Susan Haire, Stefanie 
Lindquist & Donald Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical 
Perspective, 37 L. & Soc. Rev. 143 (2002); DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. 
HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (2000); Charles Cameron, 
Jeffrey Segal & Donald Songer, Strategic Auditing in a Political Hierarchy, 94 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 101 
(2000); Frank Cross & Emerson Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: 
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeal, 107 Yale L. J. 2155 (1998); Donald R. Songer, Jeffrey A. 
Segal & Charles M. Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme 
Court—Circuit Court Interactions, 38 Amer. J. Pol. Sci. 673 (1994).    
53 The “logic of diversity” I invoke herein is drawn from the work of Scott Page.  See SCOTT PAGE, THE 
DIFFERENCE (2007) (explaining the conditions under which diversity can create better public and private 
institutions). 
54 For an example see Cameron & Cummings supra note 3. 
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impact an individual’s decision calculus.  Legal formalists, however, long denied such 
influence instead arguing judicial decision making was the by product of the 
“technocratic application of neutral legal principles.”  With respect to crafting law, a 
number of important scholars assert a strong role for social factors.  Consider Judge 
Posner’s book Overcoming Law where he identifies a host of variables that together 
define the judicial utility function.55  Among these core parameters, Judge Posner argues 
that a judges’ reputation among his or her fellow judges affects the types of judicial 
outputs he or she would be willing to support.56   
 Reputational or peer related effects are difficult to operationalize.  However, this 
has not prevented scholars from developing methodological approaches to measure the 
relative prestige and influence of federal judicial actors.57  While early work on prestige 
relied upon ratings by academics and other court observers,58 recent efforts use more 
objective measures to gain leverage on these questions.  For example, Landes, Lessig and 
Solimine operationalize prestige using the total citations to opinions produced by a given 
judge.59  These scholars support the use of citations as a proxy for prestige and influence 
arguing judges who garner high citation counts do so because their brethren either hold 
them in high regard or otherwise feel some social obligation to cite the opinion of their 
close colleague.60   
 Klein and Morrisroe resist this assertion arguing that the raw citations, relied upon 
by Landes, Lessig & Solimine, do not adequately capture the question at issue.61  
Namely, “it is not at all clear what citations measure.”62  For example, raw citations 
might capture an entire host of factors unrelated to prestige and influence including panel 
assignment, case effects, as well as other stochastic elements.  To combat these concerns, 
Klein and Morrisoe offered a modified citation analysis—limited to instances where 
individual judges are cited by name.  They assert “…more prestigious judges should 
more often be cited by name and, therefore, citations by name should be a valid indicator 
of a judge’s prestige.”63  The Klein and Morrisroe approach provides a list of ultra 
prestigious jurists whose views might be more likely to be followed than less socially 
prominent colleagues.64   
                                                 
55 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).  The chapter on the judicial utility function is based 
upon important earlier work.  See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (1993).  
56 Id. 
57 Although largely focused upon the entire circuit, for a helpful discussion of these approaches see 
generally Solimine supra note 43.  
58 See e.g. ALBERT BLAUSTEIN & ROY MIERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES: STATISTICAL STUDIES 
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1978); Blaustein, Albert Blaustein & Roy Mersky, Rating 
Supreme Court Justices, 58 A.B.A. Journal 1183 (1972);  Rodney Mott, Judicial Influence, 30 Amer. Pol. 
Sci. Rev. 295 (1936) (using rating by academics to analyze the reputations of state supreme courts).  For a 
more general discussion of the reliance upon qualitative ratings see Gregory Caldeira, In the Mirror of the 
Justices: Sources of Greatness on the Supreme Court, 10 Pol. Behav. 247 (1988). 
59 See Landes, Lessig & Solimine supra note 5. 
60 Id.  
61 Klein & Morrisroe, supra note 5. 
62 Id. at 374. 
63 Id. at 376. 
64 Id. at 381 table 2. 
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 These lists are important as socially elite opinion regarding what constitutes a 
sound legal rule is not static.   At the same time, given that the judicial social world 
displays significant adherence to particular interpretative approaches, a robust theory of 
change, must describe which actors, if any, are disproportionately likely to garner 
acceptance from their colleagues.  Specifically, at first pass, it would appear no individual 
jurist could through his or her mere pronouncement induce acceptance of a given legal 
rule by his or her colleagues.  Yet, this may depend upon the social position of the actor 
making the pronouncement.  If certain jurists in the judicial hierarchy possess a greater 
level of prestige and influence than their surrounding peers, then only a small number of 
diffuse but socially important players would actually be necessary to induce widespread 
convergence from their less prominent colleagues.  The popular literature calls this 
threshold a “tipping point.”65  In more formal terms, it is the relative measures of social 
structure developed within the networks literature which may yield information about the 
conditions under which we might observe doctrinal phase transition. 
 The growing work using the citation methodology provides significant insight 
into questions of judicial esteem.66  Building on the themes of this scholarship, we 
believe a mapping of the judicial social landscape, built upon the traffic of law clerks, 
should supplements this literature by visualizing the relative position of both individuals 
and communities of judicial actors.  In the aggregate, our analysis of the social structure 
of the federal judiciary yields insight into the path of “peer effects” by providing a 
glimpse into the overall network structure of the federal judiciary.  While our measures 
are partial and do not completely adjudicate all questions, this article, taken together with 
the prior citation based scholarship should provide for significant understanding.    
 
 B.  THE MARKET FOR FEDERAL JUDICIAL LAW CLERKS 
 Federal judicial clerkships are desirable employment opportunities to which may 
law students aspire.  For the successful applicant, an elite clerkship provides personal 
prestige as well as a series of tangible dividends.67  In addition to the immediate financial 
                                                 
65 See generally MALCOM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT (2002). 
66 There is a growing domestic and international literature analyzing judicial citations.  See e.g. Stephen 
Choi & Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges? Paper Presented at 
the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association, available at 
http://law.bepress.com/alea/17th/art61; Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court 
Justice: An Empirical Ranking of Judicial Performance, 78 S. Cal. L. Rev. 23 (2004);  Mita Bhattacharya & 
Russell Smyth, The Determinants of Judicial Prestige and Influence: Some Empirical Evidence from the 
High Court of Australia, 30 J. of Legal Stud. 223 (2001); Peter McCormick, The Supreme Court Cites the 
Supreme Court: Follow-up Citation on the Supreme Court of Canada, 1989-1993, 33 Osgoode Hall L. J. 
453 (1996).  See also supra note 42 and accompanying text.  Critiques of citations counts assert the 
randomness associated with case assignment as well as other factors, injects stochasticity into the analysis 
of citations.  Thus, a model merely built upon citation counts arguably paints an incomplete picture of 
judicial esteem.  We believe that our effort, taken together with the citation count scholarship, should yield 
strong insight into the path of information flow and the development of so called “citation clubs.”  For a 
sample of the critiques of citation analyzes see Steven Goldberg, Federal Judges and the Heisman Trophy, 
32 Fla. St. L. Rev. 1237 (2005); Arthur Austin, The Reliability of Citation Counts. in Judgments on 
Promotion, Tenure, and. Status, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 829-39 (1993); James Gordon, Cordozo’s Baseball Card, 
44 Stan. L. Rev. 899 (1992).  For a counter-argument see Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use 
of Citations in the Law, 2 Amer. L. & Econ. Rev. 381 (2000). 
67 A series of recent reports note that the bonuses offered by law firms seeking to employ a Supreme Court 
Law Clerk now reach as high as $250,000.   Taken together with their base salary such individuals can earn 
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rewards, such positions are serially correlated with advancement in a variety of 
hierarchies—including advancement within the legal profession, the legal academy and 
in some instances future elevation to the bench.  The financial and professional rewards 
are not the only attractive elements.  Commentators assert that law clerks exert an ever 
increasing influence over both the agenda68 and the substantive content of judicial 
outcomes.69  For a law student or freshly minted lawyer, the opportunity to participate in 
the shaping of the law, taken together with the social prestige and labor market dividends, 
incentivize a qualified individual to seek such employment.  
 Following an initial sorting process, including in most cases a personal interview, 
a judge may extend an offer to a selected applicant.70 Such an offer could be extended 
immediately following the interview or could come at a future moment.  The content of 
the offer is exceedingly similar across judges at a given level of the judicial hierarchy.71  
The salary is determined exogenously and “fixed.”72 As Professor Priest notes, “even 
where there are differences across clerkships, their expected value is low because of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
in excess of $400,000.  See e.g. David Lat, The Supreme Court’s Bonus Babies, The New York Times, June 
18, 2007 (asserting these bonuses are good for the legal system as they incentivize talented young lawyers 
to provide service to the Court).  
68 See e.g. ARTEMUS WARD AND DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERER’S APRRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW 
CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CHAPTER 4 &5 (2006); TODD PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF 
THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK (2006);  Barbara 
Palmer, The “Bermuda Triangle?” The Cert Pool and Its Influence over the Supreme Court’s Agenda, 18 
Const. Commen. 105 (2001); Jan Palmer and Saul Brenner, The Law Clerks’ Recommendations and the 
Conference Vote On-the-Merits on the U.S. Supreme Court, 18 Just. Sys. J. 185 (1995);  
69 See Ward & Weiden supra note 25; Peppers supra note 25; Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of 
Judicial Power, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 281, 302 (1994) (arguing that clerk involvement in opinion drafting “…can 
supply all the agenda control that is needed to swing outcomes and rationales in individual cases.”); J. 
Daniel Mahoney, Law Clerks: For Better Or For Worse?, 54 Brooklyn L. Rev. 321, 339 (1998).  
70 While there are important variations in hiring practices, such as the timing of offer, there is also 
substantial consistency in approaches.  With some limited variation, for those judges who hire permanent 
clerks, the basic selection process follows a consistent pattern.  Law students or young lawyers submit an 
application of materials including their resume, transcripts, writing sample and letters of reference.   See 
generally Ruggero J. Aldisert et al., Rat Race: Insider Advice on Landing Judicial Clerkships, 110 Penn. 
St. L. Rev. 835 (2006).  As there is significant uncertainty regarding the prospects for placement, it is quite 
common for aspirants to submit tens or even hundreds of such applications.   Id. at 837 (noting the average 
applicant send materials to sixty-five judges but “it is not atypical for a qualified applicant to apply to over 
150 judges.”) Id.  In a manner similar to other hiring practices, judges, often with the assistance current 
clerks) filter the large sea of applicants and contact a selected few for an individual interview.  Applicants 
as well as judges typically schedule a battery of such interviews.  The interview is often a face-to-face 
interaction with the judge as well as members of the judge’s staff.  Assuming basic intellectual merit, many 
judges use the interview to determine whether the individual’s temperament properly interfaces with the 
chambers.  See generally Id. 
71 See e.g. George L. Priest, Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks and Other Assortative Matching 
Markets, 22 Yale J. on Reg. 123, 154-55 (2005) ( “Although individual judges will have different 
temperaments and will work their clerks more or less intensively, job conditions themselves over a large 
range.”) 
72 See Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The Market for Federal 
Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 793, 799 n. 14 (2001); See Priest supra note 29 at 154 (“Salaries 
are fixed, set by Congress.”) 
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short tenure of the job.”73  There is very little range for negotiation over the terms of the 
position.  Essentially, the offer is dichotomous.74 
 While this description of the clerk selection process might appear innocuous, a 
substantial amount of recent scholarship argues otherwise.  The past two decades 
witnessed a burgeoning literature devoted to analyzing both the role of75 as well as labor 
market for federal judicial law clerks.  It is this latter commentary regarding clerk hiring 
that is most germane to this article.  Although not completely attributable to any single 
source, Judge Wald’s 1990 essay is the probable origin of recent commentary discussing 
the selection mechanism for federal law clerks.76  Then the Chief Judge of the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals, she describes the hiring process as undignified and cites others 
who characterize it as “frenzied”77 “ludicrous”78 and “madcap decisionmaking.” 79  
While her essay is a call for reform, she makes some keen observations about the 
conditions underlying the nature of the law clerk market. 
                                                
 She observes that an “excellent versus a mediocre team of clerks makes a huge 
difference in the judge’s daily life and in her work product.”80  Thus, judges in part seek 
strong clerks as it lightens their workload or allows them to more effectively advance 
their vision of the law.  As Judge Wald notes, “a judge sometime decides whether to file 
a separate opinion or to dissent in a case based—a least in part— upon the support she 
can anticipate from her clerks.”81  In addition to internal administrative motivations, 
external reputational considerations also encourage artful hiring practices.  In a 
commonly quoted sentence, Judge Wald asserts, “[A] judge’s reputation among his own 
colleagues may in part reflect his ability to garner the most highly credentialed clerks 
under his banner so that he can maintain a reputation as a ‘feeder’ of clerks to the 
Supreme Court.”82 
 It is the strong demand for ultra competent clerks that in large part fueled the 
“frenzied mating ritual.”83  The process, as described by Wald, includes “short fuse” 
offers and “early –bird judges skim[ming] off those applicants with the brightest 
credentials.”84  Despite various efforts to cajole their colleagues to adhere to a consistent 
hiring date, reform efforts consistently unraveled.  While unraveling alone is a strong 
source of concern for Judge Wald, it is the behavior produced by the market for clerks 
and its reflection upon the judicial branch that is her greatest concern.85              
 
73 Id. 
74 In other words, it is a zero or one—a take it or leave it offer. 
75 For a small slice of this literature see supra note 68-69 and accompanying text. 
76 See Patricia M.Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 152 (1990). 
77 See id. citing David Margolick, At the Bar: Annual Race for Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, N.Y. Times, 
March 17, 1989, at B4 col. 1. 
78 Id. 
79 See Wald supra note 76 citing internal correspondence.   
80 Id. at 153. 
81 Id.  Judge Wald additionally notes “[O]r she may ask for, or beg off, responsibility for a particular 
opinion assignment because of the availability or nonavailability of a particular clerk to work on the case.” 
Id.     
82 Id. at 154. 
83 Id. at 152 citing David Margolick, At the Bar: Annual Race for Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, N.Y. 
Times, March 17, 1989, at B4, col. 1. 
84 Id at 156. 
85 Id. at 152.  “The law of the reigns and badmouthing, spying and even poaching among judges is rife.” Id. 
 - 16 -    
15
Katz and Stafford:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2008
   
 This early commentary by Judge Wald did not end discussion and instead only 
begat further debate about the condition of the clerk market.  For example, the following 
year witnessed a rejoinder to Judge Wald’s reform agenda offered by Ninth Circuit Judge 
Alex Kozinski.86  Through his 1991 article, the self proclaimed “bad apple” 
acknowledged in reaction to “complaints about ‘badmouthing, spying and even poaching 
among judges’…we should all try to do better.”87  Despite this concession, Judge 
Kozinski otherwise argued “…there is nothing at all wrong with the current law clerk 
selection process; everything is hunky dory.”88  Instead of reform, he argued “…federal 
judges should get off their pedestals and compete….”89  For Judge Kozinski, reform 
proposals simply stymie upstarts by advantaging judges with geography, seniority and 
existing high levels of prestige.90   
 This first round of commentary, including efforts by the aforementioned jurists as 
well as others,91 brought a variety of unique reform proposals and provided a wealth of 
qualitative insight into the state of the law clerk hiring process.  The second strand of 
“clerk market” scholarship advanced an economic solution. Most notably, economists 
Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Alvin Roth along with Judge Richard Posner 
produced what has been called the Harvard-Chicago analysis of the law clerk market.92  
Using detailed survey data, the Harvard-Chicago study provided extensive, empirical 
insight into the experience of judges and clerks in the hiring process.93  Their data, taken 
together with subsequent economic analysis, argued the clerk selection process failed to 
maximize “the sum of satisfaction” of judge and clerk match.  Namely, the clerk market, 
like other markets with timing problems, is plagued with unraveling.  Individual judges 
have substantial incentive to deviate from agreed hiring dates as the existing regulatory 
mechanisms did not impose enforceable timing regulations.94  Judges who might 
otherwise be inclined to abide with a given hiring date are forced to defect from that date 
                                                 
86 Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple, 100 Yale L.J. 1707 (1991). 
87 Id. at 1715. 
88 Id. at 1707. 
89 Id. at 1714. 
90 Id. at 1719. “Judges with many years on the bench naturally have an advantage over upstarts like me 
who have to work hard at achieving a national reputation.  The problem with many reform proposals is that 
they tend to reinforce these patterns by decreasing the means by which less-favored clerkships can compete 
for desirable applicants.” (emphasis added)   
91 With a debate in full force, the years that immediately followed witnessed a number of judges and 
commentators entering the fray.  For example, Judge Oberberdorfer and his former clerk filed a response to 
Judge Kozinski arguing his objections are misplaced and that a medical style matching system would 
improve the state of affairs.  Louis F. Oberdoerfer & Michael N. Levy, On Clerkship Selection: A Reply to 
the Bad Apple, 101 Yale L. J. 1097 (1992).  Trenton Norris offered a clerk’s perspective on the discontents 
of the current market while Judge Becker, Justice Breyer and Judge Calabresi set forth their “Modest 
March 1 solution” to the clerk hiring process.    Edward R. Becker, Stephen G. Breyer & Guido Calabresi, 
The Federal Judicial Law Clerk Hiring Problem and the Modest March 1 Solution, 104 Yale L.J. 207 
(1994).  In the period between crafting and final publication of this article Judge Breyer became Justice 
Breyer. 
92 Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The Market for Federal Judicial 
Law Clerks, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 793 (2001). 
93 Id. at 796.  “A fundamental goal of our project has been to gain an improved understanding of how the 
market for federal judicial law clerks actually operates.  There are many rumors and opinions about this 
market, and few hard facts.”  Id. 
94 Id.  
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to avoid the “sucker payoff.”95  These conditions only cause other individuals to engage 
in similar practices until, across the vast majority of participants, there is widespread non-
compliance.     
 Although disagreeing with a number of conclusions of the Harvard-Chicago 
study, Professor Priest observes “job conditions are fungible across a large range…even 
where there are differences across clerkships, their expected value is low because of the 
short tenure of the job.”96  Since less prestigious judges cannot offer a compensating 
wage differential “[T]he timing of offer, thus, becomes a term of trade in the clerkship 
market transaction.”97  Thus, “first movers” such as Judge Kozinski are able to increase 
their relative standing through strategic behavior early in their career. 
 Of course, if timing of offer was the sole sorting mechanism in the clerk market, 
the traffic of law clerks might be a poor proxy from which to operationalize the aggregate 
social structure.  Some portions of the literature, if reviewed in isolation, imply that the 
strategic behavior of judges simply overwhelms law clerks and precludes them from 
obtaining their optimal match.  For example, the Harvard-Chicago data indicates a 
majority of respondents who received an offer did so either during or within two days of 
their interview.98  At the same time, judges often expected quick or even immediate 
responses to such offers.99   
 Given these conditions, clerks face significant pressure to avoid an “exploding” 
offer from a less preferred judge.   It turns out that a number of clerks, often with 
guidance from their professors and law school career services offices, use compensating 
techniques to resist a sub-optimal match.  For example, Judge Wald notes “savvy clerk 
applicants…called chambers in advance to announce that that particular judge was the 
first choice.”100  In addition, strategic scheduling is another important compensating 
technique.  Strategic schedulers organize their interviews in relationship to their choices 
over judges.  Specifically, if clerks can schedule interviews in strict association to their 
preference ordering, than an exploding offer would not be problematic but rather a 
welcome event.101  
 
C. A MARRIAGE OF CONVENIENCE? 
 The purpose of this article is not to engage the debate over the proper regulatory 
mechanism, if any, that should govern the clerk market.  The recent hiring moratorium, 
                                                 
95 The Harvard-Chicago study offers a partial solution to the problem of enforceability.  They argue “…the 
Supreme Court could play an important and productive role in helping to organize and improve the market 
for federal law clerks….we have suggested a partial solution, which would require judges who wish their 
clerks to be eligible for United States Supreme Court clerkships to enroll in a centralized matching 
system…” Id. at 885.  The genius of their proposal is how it sanctions the very individuals who are most 
inclined to engage in early exploding offers.   
96 George L. Priest, Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks and Other Assortative Matching Markets, 
22 Yale J. on Reg. 124, 154 (2005). 
97 Id.        
98 See Harvard-Chicago supra note 57 at 814 tbl. 1. 
99 Id. at 814 tbl. 2. 
100 See Wald supra note 76 at 159. 
101 See Aldisert et al. supra note 70 at 848 (quoting an unnamed Fifth Circuit judge “If an applicant really 
wants a position with a particular judge, he can signal that by offering to do an interview on the first day.”) 
Id. 
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for example, may limit some the discontents experienced under the prior regime.102  We 
will leave the evaluation of such questions to other scholars.103  For the purposes of this 
article, our interest in law clerks is simply to study and visualize their traffic to gain 
insight into questions of inter-judge connectivity.  The hiring of clerks is an intimate 
act,104 one where deliberation or forethought should attach.  While it is a choice under 
uncertainty, a significant number of signals are available.  Some signals, such as grade 
point average, law review membership or personal background, are intrinsic to the 
individual clerk.  Other cues come from third parties.  As the foregoing analysis is limited 
to law clerks which flow between various judicial actors, judges who previously 
employed the given clerk provide either an explicit or implicit signal to the subsequent 
hiring jurist.  In general, judges and communities of jurists who consistently share clerks 
probably do so because the receiver either respects the judgment of his or her colleagues 
or otherwise shares a social connection with the senders.  
 Thus, embedded in the immensely interesting literature analyzing the market for 
federal law clerks is language and commentary that should be of particular interest to the 
larger public law scholarship.  Notwithstanding their critiques of the efficiency of a 
number of allocative elements of the clerk market, many authors observe it is prestige 
which in substantial part motivates both the judges and their would-be apprentices.105  
Consider Judge Wald as quoted earlier106 and Professor Priest who notes “other things 
equal, prominent judges are able to secure the most qualified clerks.”107  Of course, the 
Harvard-Chicago findings counsel some degree of a caution from reliance upon clerk 
traffic as an unambiguous instrument for the relative social position of federal judges.  
However, even their proposal for reform, centered upon restricting feeding to the United 
States Supreme Court, acknowledges that social prestige and influence is attached to the 
ability to attract and feed “star” clerks.108    
 In all, despite the caveats the literature on the clerk market might impose, there 
remains significant information embedded in the market for judicial clerks that should 
help inform the greater public law literature.  While a simple descriptive account or 
tabulation of so called “feeder” judges would certainly demonstrate which individuals 
consistently sent their law clerks to the levels above, such analysis fails to characterize 
communities and capture concepts such as social position and attraction.  While some of 
the clerk moves may be wholly unrelated to our question of inquiry, we believe in the 
aggregate, the majority of such moves are related to social advancement.  On average, 
clerks move from judges with a lower social position to those with a higher social 
standing. Given the clear labor market payoffs available in the private market, many of 
clerks who remain in the network in order to flow between judges often do so in order to 
                                                 
102 For an analysis of the effects of the hiring moratorium see Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard 
A. Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The New Market for Federal Law Clerks, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 447 (2007).  
103 See generally Id.  
104 See Wald supra note 76 at 153 (arguing “[T]he judge-clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually 
dependant one I know of outside of marriage, parenthood, or a love affair.”) Id.  
105 The term “sorcerers’ apprentice” is borrowed from a recent book on Supreme Court Law Clerks.  See 
ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS' APPRENTICES : 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (2006). 
106 See Wald supra note 76 at 153. 
107 Id. at 162. 
108 See Avery supra note 92. 
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increase their personal position.109  In the face of significant opportunity costs for 
remaining a public employee, clerks are voting with their feet and their traffic, 
particularly in the aggregate, says something important. 
 
III. FOLLOWING THE EIGENVECTOR: THE VISUALIZATION OF A DECADE OF FEDERAL LAW 
CLERK TRAFFIC 
  
 Inspired by our desire to better understand the impact of “peer effects,” we used 
the tools of social network analysis to visualize the social architecture of the federal 
judiciary.  To build the connections between actors, we painstakingly collected a 
decade’s worth of federal law clerk information and used this data to visualize the flow of 
clerks between judges.  Bolstered by subsequent analytics, our visualizations yield some 
interesting findings.  First, while the notion of a “feeder judge” is commonly invoked, 
this study visualizes the concept.  Visualization displays a host of secondary movers who 
“feed” the feeders thereby increasing their centrality within the network.  The overall 
structure of the network, shown in Figures 1-4 infra, is also intriguing.  Despite the 
presence of clear cliques or communities, the center of the network is dense and clustered 
enough to keep interconnected most of the members of the federal judiciary.110 
 
     A. DATA COLLECTION: SOURCES AND APPROACH 
 With the assistance of our research team111, we collected available information 
for every federal law clerk employed by an Article III judge during the “natural” 
Rehnquist Court (1995-2004).  This process proved challenging as no particular data 
source contained a complete listing of such information.  However, our data set combines 
a diverse set of sources and reflects nearly all law clerks at all levels for the relevant 
years.112  
 Given its extensive treatment, we began our effort by consulting The Judicial 
Yellow Book published by Leadership Directories, Inc.  This tri-annual serial publication 
contains extensive biographic information on virtually every state and federal judge in the 
United States.  Included within this broad range of information are the names, and in 
most cases, educational history of various members of the judges’ chambers.  Using the 
fall edition in each year, our team transcribed all available identifying information 
                                                 
109 At least some number of clerks who remain and move from the Federal Circuit Court to the Federal 
District Court may do so in order to offer potential employers a better portfolio of experience.  We thank 
Owen Jones for bringing this point to our attention.  In fact, it is also possible that clerks who move 
downward in the hierarchy may do so in order to work in geographic locations that they consider more 
attractive.  Recognizing this caveat, we still believe that as a clerk searches for an additional clerkship, 
imposing whatever limiting parameters he or she chooses, that to the extent the individual selects among 
judges prestige is an important part of the decisional calculus.      
110 Figures 1-4 displayed infra do not contain every member of the federal judiciary.  Although more than 
five hundred members are present, the visualizations omit judges who over the decade long period failed to 
send a single clerk to another federal judge.    
111 We would be remiss if we did not take the opportunity to thank Eric Provins, Steven Schwartz, Courtney 
O’Brien, Pamela Kiel, Stephen Janos, Eitan Ingall, Daniel Schwartz, Art Reyes, Jon Tshiamala, Alex 
Hughes, Noah Korn, Neil Tambe, Nicole Tyrna, Erin Copland, Matthew Smith, Darin Goldstein, Alex 
Satanovsky, Benjamin Ruano and Alex Karpowitz for their assistance with data coding. 
112 By our best estimate, our data collection effort yielded approximately 97% of all law clerk events during 
the decade long period. 
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including the clerk’s full name, educational background and year of service.  Across the 
decade long period, this process yielded a significant amount of the desired data.  
 Despite the extensive amount of information contained in The Judicial Yellow 
Book, our primary data collection effort left a non-trivial number of “missing” clerk 
values.  In order to bolster the comprehensiveness of our dataset, we searched and filled 
missing values using The Judicial Staff Directory produced by CQ Press.  This second 
level was largely successful and moved the dataset near completion.  Yet, as we reviewed 
the totality of the dataset, it was clear that the set still contained some systematic bias 
with a large number of the missing values drawn from a discrete number of judges.  In 
order to obtain these public but otherwise unavailable “clerk values,” our team searched 
for missing clerk values using MartinDale-Hubbell as well as the websites of various 
prominent law firms.  To the extent the sum of these combined efforts also proved 
unavailing, we contacted both the judge’s former law clerks as well as the career services 
offices at a number of law schools located near the particular judge’s chambers.   
 In sum, while the dataset does not contain every discrete clerk value, the Katz, 
Stafford & Provins dataset (hereinafter KSP) reflects all currently available law clerk 
information for a decade long period.  Appendix I displays some sample lines of code 
drawn from the KSP dataset.  As displayed infra, a given line of code contains not only 
the clerk’s full name but also the clerk’s educational background, year of service and the 
judge’s name.113  Furthermore, in order to link our set to existing data sources and to aid 
in future research, each “clerk event” reflected as an individual line of code contains 
judge identification and seat numbers drawn from the Gary Zuk, Deborah J. Barrow & 
Gerard S. Gryski Attributes of Federal Court Judges datasets.114   
 A complete version of the KSP dataset contains in excess of 25,000 law clerk 
events drawn from not only every Article III judge but also Article I Bankruptcy Court 
Judges.  As the available data sources maintain the greatest degree of accuracy for the 
law clerks of non-senior status Article III judges,115 we restricted our analysis herein to 
these jurists.  Even with the clerks of Bankruptcy and Senior Status Judges removed, the 
dataset does not suffer from a want of information.  Namely, the remaining dataset, as 
restricted, still contains nearly 20,000 total law clerk events for the decade long period.  
These events are distributed across the federal judicial hierarchy with the majority of 
clerk events attributed to Federal District Courts. 
 Many of the clerks who appear in our dataset occupy exactly one line of code.  
These individuals typically are employed by a judge immediately following law school 
and exit the clerk network at the completion of their discrete term.  So called 
                                                 
113 For an example of the information contained in this dataset see Appendix I infra. 
114 The Zuk dataset is housed at the University of Kentucky Political Science Department under the 
umbrella of a Center named for Judicial Behavioralist  S. Sidney Ulmer.  The page contains both the 
District and Circuit court datasets.  See http://www.as.uky.edu/polisci/ulmerproject/databases.htm 
115 For a detailed discussion of senior judges including a claim that Senior Judges are unconstitutional see 
David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are Senior Judges Unconstitutional?, 92 Corn. L. Rev. 453 (2007).  
“Senior judges are the product of a patchwork of several statutes governing judicial retirement, the most 
significant of which is 28 U.S.C § 371. Federal judges become eligible for retirement benefits upon 
satisfying the “Rule of Eighty”—when the sum of their age and years of service on the federal bench 
reaches eighty.   At that point, the judge has two retirement options: outright retirement, which for 
the sake of clarity we will call ‘resignation,’ and the form of semiretirement known as ‘senior status.’” Id. 
at 460. 
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“permanent” law clerks reflect another subset of individuals in the KSP dataset.  These 
clerks reflect multiple lines of code because they are employed by one individual judge 
over a number of years.  Our analysis is not directly focused upon either of these 
subgroups.  Instead, it is directed at clerks who flow between judges.   
 To find clerk “movers,” we sorted the dataset by clerkname and then by year.  
This displayed clusters of individual clerk names.  Using limiting properties such middle 
initial, law school and undergraduate institution,116 we differentiated cases involving 
similar names.  To qualify as a clerk move, an individual employed in a given period 
must be hired by a different judge in a subsequent period.  As such, it requires two lines 
of code to qualify as a clerk move.  While we placed no precise limitation upon the 
timing of the subsequent interval, the vast majority of the clerk moves involved transfers 
in the year immediately following the first clerkship. 
 From our nearly 20,000 clerk events, we detected nearly nine hundred 
movements.  As our analysis is exceedingly conservative in it willingness to validate a 
“mover,” the number of connections present in the true population likely exceeds the 
connections in our visualization of the social landscape.  To execute the visualizations 
and craft the corresponding network statistics, we converted the lines of code 
representing “movers” into connections between judges.  For example, if law clerk 
Doe_John moved between Judge A and Judge B, than we tallied a connection between 
those two jurists.  Of the close to nine hundred total connections more than five hundred 
represented discrete movers.  In other words, the repeated connections, concentrated on a 
very limited number of judicial actors.  We entered this final dataset of clerk connections 
into Guess and Pajek117 which produced the visualizations and statistics contained in 
infra Figures 1-4. 
 
B.  THE VISUALIZATION OF LAW CLERK TRAFFIC 1995-2004  
 After sorting the data, our analysis produced 558 nodes and close to 900 edges.  
Drawing a network of this size in a consistent and unbiased manner would be rather 
implausible without the aid of a computer based automated drawing programs.  The 
automated drawing procedures also accelerate the process and provide better clarity, 
transparency and replicability.  The two automated drawing models used in this paper, 
Kamada-Kawai and Fruchterman-Reingold, are spring-embedded, force-directed 
placement algorithms.  Although the technical characterization is discussed further in 
Appendix II, an analogy may help characterize the drawing process.   
 Imagine that the judge nodes are steel rings that have opposing magnetic charges 
and thus work to repel one another.  Now visualize springs connecting the steel rings as 
the edges in the network.  The longer a spring must stretch to connect the steel rings, the 
more energy is required to stretch that spring.  The closer the position of rings without 
connections is to one another, the greater required energy to hold those positions.118  The 
aforementioned algorithms seek to minimize the energy required to balance these 
attracting and repelling forces.  After applying either Kamada-Kawai or Fruchterman-
                                                 
116 We relied upon these values this cell to the extent available.  For example, most of the law school 
information was available while much of the undergraduate institutional information was unavailable.   
117 Guess and Pajek are computer programs used by network scholars to visualize network and run various 
network statistics.   
118 Peter Eades, A Heuristic for Graph Drawing, 42 Congressus Numerantium 149 (1984). 
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Reingold, the result is a graph that generally distributes vertices evenly, minimizes edge 
crossings, uses the planar area, reflects inherent symmetry, and minimizes differences in 
edge lengths.119 
 The mathematical difference between Kamada-Kawai and Fruchterman-Reingold 
lie in their calculation of the optimal distance for edge length, interpretation of Hooke’s 
Law120 and the time iterations until the automated drawings cease.121 In terms of 
visualization, Fruchterman-Reingold tends to increase the difficulty of remaining in the 
center, pushing less connected nodes to an orbit with a larger circumference.  
Nevertheless, in overall structure and clustering, no substantive difference exists.  Some 
network scholars believe the choice of algorithms should be determined by the size and 
density of the graph, and recommend 500 nodes as a rather noisy line of demarcation.122  
Since the federal judicial network is just over 500 nodes, we included visualizations of 
both types of automated drawing.  While the Kamada-Kawai energizing algorithm 
provides a nice visual of the overall structure of the network, the Fruchterman-Reingold 
automated drawing provides greater clarity of the interconnectedness of the network’s 
center. 
 With this introduction, consider the foregoing series of networks visualizations.  
Figure 1 and 3 uses the Kamada-Kawai algorithms while Figures 2 and 4 employ 
Fruchterman-Reingold.  Figures 1 & 3 provide a wide view of the energized network 
while Figures 2 and 4 provide a close-up view including of the network’s core.  A careful 
review of the Supreme Court justices displays a familiar ideological distribution.  As this 
effort is primarily directed at classifying social structure and differentiating among lower 
court judges, what is a greater interest are the communities of both circuit and district 
court judges who cluster around and feed these Justices.  These visualizations do not 
follow the typical x and y axis and as such can be rotated.  For ease, we rotated the 
foregoing figures so as to hold the traditional left to right ideological distribution.123 
 






                                                 
119 Thomas M. J. Fruchterman & Edward M. Reingold, Graph Drawing by Force-Directed Placement, 21 
Software Practice and Experience 1129 (1991). 
120 Mark Newman, Power laws, Pareto distributions and Zipf's law, 46 Contemporary Physics 323 (2005). 
121 See Fruchterman & Reingold supra note 119. 
122 See WOUTER DE NOOY, ANDREJ MRVAR & VLADIMIR BATAGELJ, EXPLORATORY NETWORK ANALYSIS 
WITH PAJEK, 17 (2005). 
123 If the graphics were rotated 180°, the relative positions of the nodes would remain unchanged.  Rather, 
the Supreme Court Justices would simply be distributed North to South rather than East and West. 
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FIGURE 1: A WIDE VIEW OF THE KAMADA KAWAI ENERGIZED NETWORK 
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FIGURE 3: A CLOSE VIEW OF THE KAMADA KAWAI ENERGIZED NETWORK  
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C. THE STRUCTURE OF THE JUDICIAL SOCIAL NETWORK 
 In network analysis, after the energizing algorithm is applied, the difference 
between center and periphery can have different meanings depending upon the 
operationalization of the edges and nodes, and the overall structure of the network.  In the 
judicial network, we have a densely connected center with clusters around the Supreme 
Court justices.  The circuit and occasional district judges in these clusters frequently send 
clerks to the same member of the Supreme Court or to an ideological bundle of judges or 
justices.  However, occasionally, a lower court judge sends a clerk across these clusters.  
These core feeders are sometimes supplied with clerks from surrounding circuit or district 
judges.  The energizing algorithms push judges to the periphery based in part on the 
number of degrees of separation from both the feeders as well as the Supreme Court 
justices.   
 Although the formal institutional authority of each federal judge is nearly 
identical for holding the circuit/district distinction, surely the informal prestige and 
influence of every judge is not equal.  Given this analysis, do we believe the judges 
clustered around the Supreme Court are influentially equivalent to the judges on the 
margins of the network?  Are all Circuit Court Judges as equally influential as say 
Merrick Garland, Diarmuid O’Scannlain, Alex Kozinski, Michael Luttig, Michael 
Boudin or Richard Posner?  After operationalizing connections based on micro decisions 
by both the clerks and the receiving judges, we believe that centrality in this judicial 
network, in the aggregate, is a rough proxy for judicial esteem. 
 Considering the Fruchterman-Reingold automated drawing tends to spread nodes 
around the periphery in relatively small networks, when speaking about the overall 
structure of the judicial network, we will refer to the Kamada-Kawai energized network. 
In each network visual, we have included a partition for the formal distinctions between 
district, circuit and Supreme Court judges.  We might expect the district court judges to 
fill the space near the outer rim of the network and seldom spread into the center. Yet, 
District Court judges are diffused throughout the network, including a few judges who 
find themselves in close proximity to or in the core of the network.  The concentration of 
district judges does appear to decrease from the periphery to the center.  The Circuit 
judges are also dispersed throughout the network and are densely concentrated in the 
center.  Despite egalitarian institutional authority, certain agents have emerged as 
informal forces.  This broad distribution of judges, both circuit and district, argues that 
while institutional authority is a valid and important component for the study of the 
judicial decision making an legal change, we also need to consider informal authority and 
social structure. 
 
D. THE POWER LAW PROPERTIES OF THE JUDICIAL DEGREE DISTRIBUTION 
 These visualizations provide insight into the nature of informal authority in the 
federal judiciary hierarchy.  Figures 3 and 4 display micro-level communities of jurists 
linked to each other through their law clerks.  While the general composition of these 
subgroups might be of little surprise to many court scholars124, some interesting actors do 
                                                 
124 It is likely of little surprise to observe prolific Judges such as the Honorable Richard Posner, Harry T. 
Edwards, Samuel Alito, Merrick Garland, J. Harvie Wilkinson, Michael Luttig, Guido Calabresi located in 
the core of the network. 
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find themselves located within the core of the network.125  Furthermore, as noted above, a 
select number of centrally located jurists act to bridge communities thereby maintaining a 
fairly high degree of connectivity across these sub-groups.  
 In broad stroke, one manner to classify the overall structure of a network is to 
tally the number of connections or “degrees” between the actors and determine the 
distribution of such connections.  With respect to such a distribution, there exist many 
potential states of the world.  For example, the relative distribution could be fairly 
uniform—with a wide number of actors possessing a moderate level of degrees. The 
degrees could be distributed normally or alternatively could be centered upon a small 
number of socially prominent actors.  The degree distribution in this judicial network 
clearly has heavy tails.  
 The “top-heavy” or “fat tails” distributions normally refer to three specific 
probability density functions: the exponential, the power law, and log-linear.126  
                                                 
125 Of greatest note are the District Court Judges located close to the core of the network.  Included among 
them is Judge Michael Mukasey of the Southern District of New York.  In late 2007, Judge Mukasey was 
confirmed as the Eighty-First Attorney General of the United States.  
126 A Power Law, Exponential, and Log-Normal Distributions are generated by the following equations 








































.  In each equation, the probability of reaching a given 
value varies inversely linearly with the power of that value.  Often any distribution that meets this criterion 
is said to be a power law.  See Aaron Clauset, Cosma Rohilla Shalizi, & M. E. J. Newman, Power-Laws 
Distributions in Empirical Data, available at http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0706/0706.1062v1.pdf  
(last visited January 4th, 2008). To then demonstrate the function was a power law, scientists used to create 
a histogram of the frequencies then log the x and y-axis then look for the negative linear relationship, and if 
the slope of that line was between -2 and -3, the distribution was called a power law, and the slope termed 
Alpha.  See David C. Roberts & Donald L. Turcotte, Fractality and Self-Organized Criticality of Wars, 6 
Fractals 351 (1998); Felisa A. Smith, Body Mass of Late Quaternary Mammals, 84 Ecology 3403 (2003); 
Takashi Ito, et. al., Toward a Protein-Protein Interaction Map of the Budding Yeast: A Comprehensive 
System to Examine Two-Hybrid Interactions in All Possible Combinations between the Yeast Proteins, 97 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 1143 (2000); Newman supra note 120. The Alpha for 
our line is -2.3, placing out distribution fairly centered in the acceptable Alpha interval for a power law.  
Then to calculate the statistical likelihood of that distribution being a power law, the least squares 
estimators were then applied to the log/log plots any the coinciding p-values then illustrated the likelihood 
of the distributions.  Unfortunately, the least squares parameter estimates are systematically biased because 
of the large fluctuations in the tails of each of this probability functions.  In other words, noise or variation 
in the few observations in the tail disproportionately affects error estimates.   
As the included functions indicate, different processes are responsible for these distributions.  
Recently, a new technique, derived from maximum likelihood estimators and Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistic, has emerged to differentiate between these probability distribution functions.  See generally 
WILLIAM H. PRESS, NUMERICAL RECIPES IN C: THE ART OF SCIENTIFIC COMPUTING (1992); INDRA 
CHAKRAVARTI, ET. AL., HANDBOOK OF METHODS OF APPLIED STATISTICS, VOLUME I  (1967).  The statistic 
requires much larger sample sizes and orders of magnitude greater in degree variation than our sample 
contains to adjudicate which function is responsible for our observed frequency distribution.  However, 
differentiating between the exponential, power law, and log-normal distributions is not necessary for our 
later claims about phase transitions and self-organized criticality as all three heavy-tailed functions would 
suffice.  Nevertheless, we are prepared to claim that based on the inversely logarithmic relationship and -
2.3 alpha, we are prepared to claim our distribution is most consistent with a power law distribution, but 
could be one of the other non-linear fat-tailed or top-heavy distributions produced by exponential or log-
normal probability functions.  
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Differentiating between the different probability functions is relatively difficult because 
of the small number of orders of magnitude within our sample population.  The parameter 
estimates for the distribution also increase in difficulty because degree distribution is a 
discrete variable.   
Specifically, many such distributions of “degrees” track the power law 
distribution or display power law properties.  Power Law distributed phenomena appear 
in studies throughout many disciplines including physics, biology, astronomy, finance 
and computer science.  In renowned physicist Mark Newman’s words, “When the 
probability of measuring a particular value of some quantity varies inversely as a power 
of that value, the quantity is said to follow a power law.”127  Thus, the normal manner in 
which people test for power law distributions is to construct a frequency distribution plot 
and look for the L shape, then log the x and y-axes to see a straight line.  
 One difficulty associated with accurately asserting that given phenomena are 
power law generated is the noise in the tail of the distribution.  Specifically, given the 
nature of inverse exponentials in the tail of the distribution, the number of observations in 
the tail is likely to be very small.   
 In Figure 5, the frequency distribution plot of the number of judges by the degree 
of each judge (the degree is simply the measure of how many edges are incident with 
each node), the familiar L-shaped curve emerges.  Within the frequency plot, we included 
the both separate and aggregate plots for the district and the circuit courts separately and 
aggregated.  The Supreme Court justices are excluded from the analysis because their 
structural position relative to degree distribution is a construct of their institutional 
position.  Each year, each justice accepts a defined number of clerks, virtually all of 
whom have served as a clerk for one of their lower court colleagues.128   In the log/log 
graph, the inverse line is apparent but obviously noisy.  The noise in this graph prevents 
us from definitively concluding that judicial degree is distributed as a power law.  Yet, 
considering the relatively small number of observations comparable to the AOL example, 











                                                 
127 See Newman supra note 120. 
128 In the period 1995-2004, we find that nearly 99% of the Supreme Court law clerks were drawn from 
lower courts.  Professor W. William Hodes, Law Clerk to Justice Ginsburg during the 1996 term, 
represents a rare exception to this global trend.  A former student of Justice Ginsburg from her service as a 
law professor at Rutgers, Mr. Hodes served as her law clerk without first serving for a lower court judge.  
Other exceptions include individuals such as Rachael L. Brand who clerked for the Honorable Charles 
Fried of the Massachusetts Supreme Court prior to her service to Justice Kennedy and Adam M. Samaha 
who clerked for the Honorable Alexander Keith of the Minnesota Supreme Court prior to clerking for 
Justice Stevens.  
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FIGURE 5: THE POWER LAW PROPERTIES OF LAW CLERK TRAFFIC  
 






























































 Figure 5 reinforces our claim that the degree of federal judges is consistent with a 
power law distribution.  We have excluded the Supreme Court Justices from the analysis 
for previously stated reasons.  Although the district and circuit partitions may be of 
individual interest, the frequency distribution of the aggregated judicial levels provides 
the most useful information about the entirety of the interactions.  For instance, in the 
“aggregate” column, there is an exponential decline of degree frequency over the first six 
degree classifications.   
 Table 1 below provides rather stark evidence regarding the concentration of 
degree distribution in the tail.  Only 3.42% of the judges have six or greater incident 
lines.  Those twenty-five judges account for 33.58% of the total connections.  The fifteen 
judges or 1.28% of the population, that has a degree greater than ten are responsible for 
19.27% of the connections.   Again, while we cannot definitively conclude that the 
frequency distribution of clerk movements perfectly mirrors the power law, Table 1 
displays the many of properties of the power law.  
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 If our micro-level clerk movements both from the perspectives of the clerk and 
receiving judge were successful in at least partially operationalizing professional 
relationships and prestige, then having a degree distribution that follows a power law is 
substantively interesting for both our conclusions about the role “peer effects” of the 
federal judiciary and their relationship to theories of legal change.  Namely, Professor 
Newman demonstrates that the two most likely causes of power law distributions are 
Yule’s Law and Self-Organized Criticality—causes that need not be mutually 
exclusive.129   
 Yule’s Law describes a process where the function generating the distribution 
builds upon itself.130  In reduced form, a common example displaying this mechanism is 
the so-called “rich get richer” phenomena.  When the percentage of return an individual 
investor receives is positively related the quantity of money that person is able to invest 
than those with large initial endowments are able to extend their relative advantage over 
those at a lower initial starting investment.   Essentially, Yule’s law is saying that history 
matters.  How wealthy you are today is a function of how wealthy you were yesterday. 
 It seems likely that social or professional influence may in part manifest or grow 
in this manner.  The more highly respected a colleague the greater the probability that 
two people with the same view of that colleague interact and share their opinions.  These 
conversations would then reinforce their original assessments while possibly informing 
the opinions of present third parties, which would then increase that initial probability for 
secondary interactions.  As such, following Yule’s Law a relatively small number of 
                                                 
129 See Newman supra note 120. 
130 Id.  
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agents occupy vastly disproportionate influence in the system and play an important role 
in generating phase transitions.  Table 1, again, provides evidence that the judicial 
network exhibits these properties. 
 “Self-Organized Criticality” describes how dynamic complex systems tend to 
arrange over time at the precipice for great change.131  In 1987 at Brookhaven National 
Laboratory, Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Ken Weisenfeld decided to play a game with a 
hypothetical sand pile.  Imagine randomly dropping sand onto a flat surface one grain at a 
time.  Eventually a pile will form.  The pile will start flat, and with time will grow 
steeper.  Except, at irregular intervals avalanches occur and flatten the base of the sand 
pile, which will then grow again.  By moving their game into computer simulations, Per 
Bak and colleagues kept track of the size of the avalanches in terms of the number of 
grains that move, and found that there was no typical or average size of an avalanche 
because the avalanche sizes followed a power law and not a normal distribution.  
Although the most frequent avalanches involved a single grain or two, the avalanche 
could also encompass a thousand or ten, and sometimes millions of grains that would 
restructure the entire sand pile.  At first it seemed that virtually any avalanche would 
occur at any time.   
 Nevertheless, certain trends became evident.  Obviously, the steeper the angle of 
the sand pile and the greater the amount of sand, the more likely a catastrophic avalanche 
would form.  To better illustrate the game, Bak and colleagues then changed the angle of 
viewing the game so it was as though a person was standing directly over the sand pile, 
and shaded the pile according to steepness.  As the angle increased the computer shaded 
the hill red to indicate a critical state.  When the pile was at a greater equilibrium and less 
likely to be subject to greater avalanches, the computer shaded the pile green.  The piles 
would begin green, then gradually shade red until an avalanche or several would settle 
the pile, only to provide a larger base for the next pile to form.  As the number of grains 
increased, so too would the number of red spots.  If a grain were to fall on the green 
plateaus, the likelihood of a cataclysmic avalanche was small, but if that same grain were 
to fall near the bright red peak, an avalanche could spread to other peaks flattening the 
entire pile.   The sand pile would eventually jettison relatively stable equilibriums and 
organize itself at points of criticality, on the brink of great change.  Although Bak and 
colleagues demonstrated that that each grain of sand regardless of where it falls may or 
may not cause an avalanche, and avalanche will not have a typical style thus making 
predictive properties impossible, perhaps seeing multiple red peaks in close proximity, 
may inform us the likelihood of a catastrophic avalanche is greater than when the pile 
appears to be a gentle shade of green. 
Forest fires provide another potentially illuminating example.132  Consider a 
single tree in an empty field.  The likelihood this first tree will reproduce is dependent 
upon the surrounding conditions.  A seedling will grow best with more access to sun and 
thus the more trees which surround the original tree the lower the probability for 
reproduction.  In an open field, the original tree should be able to reproduce in multiple 
directions, and that tree’s offspring so too should be able to reproduce in certain 
directions until the field is full.   
                                                 
131 See PER BAK, HOW NATURE WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANIZED CRITICALITY (1996). 
132 See Barbara Drossel & Franz Schwabl, Self-Organized Critical Forest-Fire Model, 69 Phys. Rev. Lett. 
1629 (1992). 
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As the density of the field increases to its carrying capacity, the trees will begin 
competing for scarce resources, including light, soil, minerals and of course water.  As a 
byproduct of this competition, both the field and the tree become drier.  If the 
environment should reach a critical point, a lightning strike or a random variation in 
temperature will start a fire.  It is tempting to assert that this fire spreads randomly.  
However, since the fire needs trees for fuel, it will spread as the trees have spread.  Thus, 
the manner in which the trees of the forest self-organized directs the very conditions for 
the fire to spread across the field.  The cycle from barren field to forest to conflagration 
back to barren field is a type of phase transition.  As with most complex systems, 
prediction of either the path of the fire or the ideological change is impossible with such 
limited information, but as information increases, the model can generate more consistent 
and precise conclusions.  What is the initial position of the fire?  In what direction and 
with what magnitude is the wind blowing?  What are the burn rates for different trees?  
Where is the water located?  What are the physical boundaries? 
 As noted above, the causal mechanisms for power law distributions are not 
mutually exclusive.  If complex systems self-arrange at positions on the precipice of great 
change, Yule’s Law seems like a possible source for the degree distribution in the federal 
judicial network.  We might assume that a phase transition is less likely to occur when 
that conversion requires the mobilization of a large proportion of actors.  Accordingly, if 
power, formal and informal, is concentrated in a few nodes, each capable of influencing 
their communities, which can influence and in turn other communities, then that system 
is at a point of conversion.  If the process that creates the concentration of power is such 
that the more influence an agent possesses the more influence that actor can acquire, then 
Yule’s Law may very well be the process through which a system self-organizes at 
positions of criticality.  
 
IV. FROM MICRO TO MACRO AND BACK AGAIN:  PEER EFFECTS, EMERGENCE AND 
CONVERGENCE IN A FEDERAL JUDICIAL HIERARCHY 
  
 Whether the actors in the federal judiciary self-organize at positions of criticality, 
follow Yule’s law or display some element of both, our study helps at least partially 
inform the conditions for doctrinal phase transition.  Just as knowledge of the position of 
trees throughout the field provides greater understanding of how the fire spreads, so to, 
various theories of legal change will be better informed by understanding the relative 
social position of various actors in judicial hierarchy.  Whether invoking illusions to 
fireflies, sand piles or automobile traffic the overall goal of this endeavor is to illuminate 
the discussion of judicial “peer effects.” Namely, while there are important properties 
drawn from each major judicial decision making theory, better understanding of the 
manner in which social factors structure the global outputs for the federal judicial 
hierarchy is arguably needed.    
 Judicial decision making is decision making in a hierarchy.  Across all the actors 
and opinions, particularly those produced by lower courts, understanding why certain 
individuals and cases are privileged is a non-trivial enterprise.  An important precursor to 
gaining leverage on these “peer effects” is characterizing the social structure in which 
actors operate.  Following on Judge Posner’s discussion of “reputation,” as well as other 
literature discussing prestige and influence literature, it is difficult to deny a role for 
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social factors.  Simply put, social factors “matter” and as such the federal judiciary is 
simultaneously marked by both emergent and convergent behaviors.  Despite the 
widespread agreement, within the bounded range of legal discourse, there are still periods 
of legal change where the rise of new interpretative approaches is almost certainly 
supported by structurally important actors who champion a particular legal rule.   
 In all, despite the sorting issues associated with the law clerk market, we believe 
the traffic of law clerks provides significant insight into the relative clout actors in a 
judicial hierarchy.  Namely, existing methods relying exclusively upon citation counts or 
subjective evaluations certainly furthered collective understanding about questions of 
social stature.  However, these approaches did not bring complete closure to the debate.  
While we recognize that this article also does not completely adjudicate all open 
questions, it builds upon this earlier work by offering a graph theoretic approach to 
formalize discussion of concepts such as social position and social structure.  
 A significant number of individual-level theories of judicial decision making—
including behavioral and strategic theories—purport to provide a complete view of 
judicial decision making.  Other scholarship such as those offered by the historical 
institutionalists, emphasizes the Court’s constitutive features and challenges strategic 
theories arguing the macro patterns of judicial decisions are inconsistent with observed 
macro-level judicial outputs.  Our emphasis on judicial “peer effects” is an attempt to fill 
the void in these respective theories by arguing the existing social structure of the 
hierarchical federal judiciary in part explains how an existing set of individual 
mircomotives map to the aggregate macro-behavioral judicial outcomes.133  Namely, 
while partisan policy preferences, strategic and other considerations are certainly 
important—so too are social factors.  If judicial decision making is in part socially 
constituted than consider this an investigation of the relevant architecture.  Scaffolding 
comes in a variety of flavors and different structures consequence outcomes in different 
manners.  As such, we believe the public law literature should embrace a variety of 
complex systems based approaches including but not limited to network analysis. 

















                                                 
133 See Shelling supra note 16. 
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APPENDIX I: A Sample from the Katz, Stafford, Provins Law Clerk Dataset 
 
Year Clerk Name Undergraduate Law School Judge Name Id Seat No.       
1995 Yoo_Christopher_S Harvard Northwestern Randolph_A_Raymond 12109 DC.09.03 
1995 Metzger_Gillian_E Yale Columbia Wald_Patricia_M 18260 DC.11.01 
2000 Van_Houwelling_Molly_S Michigan Harvard Boudin_Michael 22750 01.01.08 
2000 Seinfeld_Gil Harvard Harvard Calabresi_Guido 23155 02.03.09 
2000 Stras_David Kansas Kansas Luttig_J_Michael 22225 04.13.01 
2002 Prescott_J_J Stanford Harvard Garland_Merrick_B 30168 DC.10.02 
1998 Tushnet_Rebecca_L Harvard Yale Becker_Edward_R 590 03.09.03 
1996 Gulati_Mitu Chicago Harvard Alito_Samuel_A 127 03.04.05 
1998 Zearfoss_Sarah Bryn_Mawr Michigan Ryan_James_L 13110 06.05.04 
2000 Milani_Anup Georgetown Chicago Williams_Stephen_F 20460 DC.01.09 
 
 
APPENDIX II: From a Ring Lattice to an Energized Network 
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 The above visual is a useful depiction of how the energizing algorithms processes 
the information contained in the network file to produce the visual depiction of the 
network contained in this study.  Stage 1 is a picture of how Pajek initially registers the 
information.  This is a circular network, in which the program begins at nine o’clock on 
the circle with the first node entered into the network data file.  Each node in order listed 
in the data file then follows the original node moving clockwise around the circle.  Once 
all of the nodes are aligned around the circle, the program allots the connections from the 
data file drawing lines between the nodes.  Obviously, Stage 1 is not a useful 
visualization. 
 Stage 2 represents the early stage of the Kamada-Kawai spreading algorithm:  
certain nodes based on their centrality are being fixed in the center, nodes that are 
connected attract one another and those that are not repel.  The nodes with higher degrees 
immediately move to the center.  Parts of the graph have maintained the initial circular 
structure, but the graph is flux and begins to spread.  In Stage 3, the graph no longer 
circular, but the connections appear long and are thus strained according to Hooke’s Law.  
In Stage 4, the graph has reached equilibrium, the connection length is balanced between 
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